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TABLE A.1
Arithmetic Means for Major Economic Variables During Phases and Subphases
of the Chilean Exchange Control RegIme, 1908—71
Line 1908— 1928—




1.1.1 PLD-NER (1/27/59=1.00) 1.64
1.1.2 1960 U.S. $ per escudo 304 P200
1.1.3 Free or black-market rate/NA rate 1.00
1.1.4 EER/NA rate
1.1.4.1 Consumption goods (1965= 100)
1.1.4.2 Investment goods (1965100)
1.1.5 Terms of trade
1.1.5.1 Export unit value/import unit value
(1965=1.00) 1.44' 1.46
1.1.5.2 Copper returns: export unit value/import
unit value 1.16° 1.06














1.2.4 Rates of growth (%)
1.2.4.1 Import value (constant U.S. $) 2.5 —4.1
1.2.4.2 Export value (constant U.S. $) 3.5 —11.7
1.2.5 Trade statistics: Chile's major trading partners
1.2.5.1 Imports recorded by Chile/exports recorded
by others








0.77 0.73 0,69 0.57
0.95 0.58 0.15 0.05
1.01 1.70 1.55 4.06
0.99 1.27 1.49 1.06
1.25 1.24 1.30 0.96
0.99 1.03 0.96
0.97 1.01 0,96









0.35 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.19
(0.33
0.15 0.24 0.27 0.37 0.35 0.35 1.0.36J
0.22
(0.34)
0.50 0.45 0.43 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.59
(0.04)







1931— 1940— 1947— 1952— 1956— 1959— 1962— 1965—
39 46 51 55 58 61 64 70 1971
I—H II II II III IV H HI H
0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
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1.2.6.1 Exports less imports (mill. 1960 U.S. $) 11.2 7.6
1.2.6.2 QR index
1.2.6.3 Export capacity to import (19651.00) 1.03
1.2.6.4 Net foreign reserves held by banking system
(mill. U.S. $)
1.2.6.5 Foreign debt at yr. end/exports for yr. 0.87 1.23
1.2.6.6 Taxes: related to foreign trade/total 0.83 0.63
1.2.6.7 lmports/GDP 0.52 0.38
1.2.6.8 ExportsfGDP 0.44




Rate of change of GDP deflator (%)





2.3 Unemployment rate in Santiago in June
3. Resource allocation
































4.1 Aver, wage/consumption deflator (1965=1.00)











5.3 Agriculture GDP 2.6 2.2
5.4 Invest, in structures and equip.





• 1931— 1940— 1947— 1952— 1956— 1959— 1962— 1965—
39 46 51 55 58 61 64 70 1971
r—,1I 11 II II III Iv II III II
7.8 —0.1 0.1 3.2 —9.7 1.2 9,1 19.6—110.9
0.94 0.95 0.98 0.96 0.92 0.96
0.48 0.47 0.48 0.62 0.65 0.71 0.85
03
7.0 89.1 79.1 29.9 —60.0—246. —17.0k
1.20 1.31 2.52 2.41 2.51
3 0.37 0.35 0.29 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.18
3 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14
38 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12
44 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.26
5
8.5 15.1 20.8 47.8 37.6 19.3 35.4 31.7 20.0
çO 0.81 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.92 0.96 0.95 1.00
91 0.072'0.053 0.062 0.052
0.20 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.10
0.09 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06
h10 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20
0.77 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.77 0.76 0.78
0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.11
0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
11 0.92 0.98 1.01 1.14 0.99 0.94 0.92 1.06
03
0.30 0.22 0.13 0.18 0.28 0.24 0.44
0.44 0.45 0.56 0.48 0.38 0.35 0.45
0.01 —0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.10
0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.24
0.57 0.67 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.92 1.12
0.58 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.60 0.64 0.67
—1.1' 2.2 1.2 0.9 1.4 1.2 1.6 2.5 6.0
2.6' 7.5 6.3 6.8 —1.4 2.8 4.9 5.1 12.1
B 1.Y 1.2 0.9 1.7 10.7 —2.9 0.7 2.9 5.8
2 7.0 3.8 4.6 2.7 15.1 2.6 4.0 —7.7
2.7 3.3 3.1 2.8 3.1 3.4 2.4
4;
317318 APPENDIXA
Notes to Table A .1
Nom: The underlying data for virtually all the series listed are from the national
accounts of Banco Central [1956b—73b], CORFO, and ODEPLAN, and unpublished data 6
from these three institutions. For 1940—71, exact sources, procedures used to make data
C
from various sources comparable, and evaluation of the data for all series, except as
indicated below in the notes for individual variables, are given in Behrman [1974:Chap.
3]. Data before 1940, except as noted below, are based on estimates from Ballesteros and
Davis [1963] linked by 1940 values. For the earlier period, it was assumed that the GDP
5,
deflator was perfectly correlated with the wholesale price index and that government con-
sumption was perfectly correlated with government product.
1.1The national accounts exchange rate, which enters into the calculation of series
1.1.1 to 1.1.4, is a weighted average of the various legal nominal exchange rates in effect
C
in each period; it is used by CORFO and ODEPLAN in the preparation of the national c
accounts. c
1.1.1Indicates the cost of foreign exchange (exclusive of tariffs, related charges,
and import premiums) in constant-value escudos. The base date of January 27, 1959, was
chosen because Instituto de EconomIa [1963:2031 and Leftwich [1966:4071 suggest that,
given the trade regime then in effect, this rate was very close to equilibrium.
F 11.2 Number of current dollars required to purchase one escudo or 1,000 pesos
(the unit used before 1960), adjusted to 1960 dollars by use of the GNP deflator for the
Ii United States (Council of Economic Advisers [1972]). This variable provides a measure
of the decline in real terms in the foreign exchange value of the Chilean currency over a time. Ratios in 1960 dollars for 1908—60 are from Hurtado (l966:Table 14]. Current dol- b Jars, 1960—69, from Ffrench-Davis [1971:286]; 1970—71, unpublished cfata of the Central r
Bank. -
1.1.3The numerator is the legal free-market NER, if a legal free-market existed.
Otherwise (in most cases), the black-market rate is used. The, ratio is an indicator of the
dispersion among exchange rates resulting from exchange policy. Since it is a measure
of currency demand in illegal markets, it also measures the restrictiveness of exchange
control in official markets.
1.1.4Effective exchange rates are discussed more fully in section 5.1. The ratios
reflect the relative favoritism granted under the foreign trade regime to consumption and
investment imports. /
1.L5.2The numerator (1925100) is that part of the unit value of copper exports
by large-scale mining enterprises which is returned to Chile in the form of factor pay- t
ments, intermediate input purchases in the domestic market, taxes, and related payments.
From the point of view of the owners of large-scale mining operations, the exchange rates
for these return flows are often unfavorable. See Reynolds [1965:381].
1.1.4.1 and 1.1.4.2U.S. deflator is from Council of Economic Advisers [19721.
1.1.5.1Before 1940, from Mamalakis [1971b:527, 661].
1.1.6Average premium on competitive and noncompetitive imports. For each of
these categories of imports the rate equals [(1.0 + implicit tariff rate)/EER] —1.0or
[(domestic price/c.i.f. price)/EERI —1.0.The ITRs for 1961 are from Table 5.3; the 1
EERs, from Table A.7; description of the 1TRs is given in Appendix B; the source of the
ratios of price indices is given in Table A.8. In effect, the rate indicates the extent to
which the ratio of domestic to foreign prices for imports exceeds the effective exchange
rate. Premiums may be received by importers because of the existence of effective quan. g
titative restrictions. However, several qualifications concerning this interpretation are
warranted. (i) Disequilibriums between domestic and foreign prices due to adjustment
lags may result in a positive or a negative premium. Given the Chilean history of inflation
(series 2.1), such disequilibriuxns may be of considerable importance. (ii) Water in the
tariffs implies a negative premium. (iii) Even if the premium arises purely from effective
quantitative restrictions, the government (not only private importers) may be the recip-
ient of part of the premium through government imports.
1.1.7See Table A.8 and text discussion accompanying the table. a'STATISTICAL TABLES 319
1.2.1and1.2.2In each pair of braced figures for 1965—70, upper figure is for 1965—
a] 66 and is comparable with figures for earlier years. Lower figure is for 1967—70 and is
ta comparable only with figure for 1971.
ta 1.2.4.1 and 1.2.4.2Before 1940, from Anuarios Co,nercio Exterior, as given by
as Hurtado [1966:Table 10].
p. 1.2.5.1 and 1.2.5.2From IMF and IBRD [1953—721. These comparisons are mea-
sures of the order of magnitude of evasions of the Chilean foreign trade regime by illegal
transactions, under the assumption that all transactions are recorded by the trading part-
ner. If there were no unrecorded transactions in the Chilean trade statistics, a discrepancy
of about 10 per cent would be expected due to the difference between the f.o.b. value of
ties exports and the c.i.f. value of imports. For a full discussion of the merits and the short-
sect comings of this procedure, see Bhagwati [19691. Chile's eight major trading partners ac-
counted for 76 per cent of imports and 85 per cent of exports in 1948—70. The average
percentage share of the eight countries in total Chilean trade in this period was as fol-
es, lows: United States, 41.4; Federal Republic of Germany, 9.5; United Kingdom, 9.5;
'as Argentina, 7.0; Netherlands, 4.2; Japan, 3.1; Italy, 3.1; and France, 3.1.
at, 1.2.6.1Data before 1940 are from Anuarios Comercio Exterior, as given by
Hurtado [1966:Table 10]; deflator is from Council of Economic Advisers [1972]. For
10$ recent years, this series is not always identical to that implied by the probably more re-
he liable estimates in Table 8.1.
ire 1.2.6.2For 1952—69, estimate by Ffrench-Davis [197 1:302] based on a careful cx-
'er amination of Central Bank documents. For earlier years, I extended the series on the
basis of an estimated relation between the Ffrench.Davis series and series 1.1.7; the cor-
coefficient between the two is 0.70, which is significant at theI per cent level
for 18 observations. In the words of Ffrench-Davis, the index is intended to summarize
the effects of "prohibitions, quotas, administrative delays, prohibitive tariffs, and import
•the deposits."
Ure 1.2.6.3Value of exports divided by the unit value of imports.
1.2.6.4Data for 1940—46, 1947—5 1, and 1952—69 are apparently not comparable.
1.2.6.5Based partly on Humud [1969:100, 225—228, 241—242]. Public debt only
before 1930; public debt plus government-guaranteed private debt after 1930.
1.2.6.6Based partly on Humud [1969:100, 225—228, 241—242]. Numerator includes
import taxes, export taxes, implicit taxes on local cost of production for large-scale mm-
ing, and direct taxes on large-scale mining. Denominator includes all taxes (including
taxes of the social security system).
1.2.6.7 and 1.2.6.8Before 1940, from Anuarios Comercio Exterior, as given by
Hurtado [1966:Table 10].
1.2.6.9Before 1940, from Humud [1969:100, 238].
2.2Capacity is defined by the trend-through-the-peaks method; the series is, there-
fore, a measure of actual production at a particular time compared to the secular trend
of ' inproduction. This method tends to overstate capacity utilization near the end points
or since the presence of peaks before or after the sample period may change the trend line,
the but it does provide a useful and definable measure of short-run fluctuations relative to
the historically feasible levels of capacity. For discussion of the advantages and limitations of
to the method, see Behrman [l973b].
ige 3.2Before 1940, based in part on data from the National Statistical Service as
*fl given by Mamalakis [1965:131].
Ire 3.3.2Numerator includes government direct investment and gqvernment-financed
at investment.
4.1Secular trend is used, rather than actual employment data, which is unavailable
iC for the country as a whole for any extended period of time. As a result, the wage level is
understatedwhen unemployment is high relative to when unemployment is low. When un-
P' employment is high the number employed is below the secular trend. Since the actual
wage bill is divided by the trend rather than the actual number employed to get the




5.5Defined not in growth terms but as the ratio of gross value of investment in
structures and equipment during a phase or subphase to the change in real gross domestic




d. For 1946 only.
e. This rate is an overstatement of the growth which would have had to occur for it
to move from the value for the last year of the previous period to the last year of this




h.Excluding 1917. 1918, and 1920.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes to Table A .2
Nom: Two hypotheses are tested in each case: (i) that phase-coincident deviations
in the growth rate occurred for the 1940—55 or the 1962—64 Phase II periods, the
58 Phase III years, or the 1959—61 Phase IV liberalization; and (ii) that deviations in
the growth rate occurred in the first year of each of the three liberalization attempts
(i.e., 1956, 1959, and 1965).
The sample period is not extended further because consistent data are lacking before
1940 and after 1965. (The components of exports and imports are consistent only for
1947—65.) As of this writing (1971), two sets of Chilean national accounts are available:
CORFO accounts for 1940—65 and ODEPLAN accounts for 1960—71. The COR.FO
accounts, which are used here, are preferred because they contain a substantially larger
number of observations. For comparisons between them see Behrman E1974:Chap. 3].
The regressions were carried out by the method of ordinary least squares. For each
regression, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the real value of the variable, and
the independent variables include a constant, a time trend, multipLicative dummy vari-
ables multiplied by the time trend (with nonzero values for the years indicated in the
column heads), and a first-order autocorrelation coefficient (p), in brackets, estimated by
the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure in cases in which the hypothesis of correlation is not
rejected by the Durbin-Watson statistic (DW). The figures in parentheses are the absolute
values of the r statistics. For a two-tailed test with 20 degrees of freedom (approximately
the number in each regression), a t statistic of 0.7 is significantly nonzero at the 50 per
cent level; a t value of 1.3 is significantly nonzero at the 5 per cent level; and a value of
2.8 is significantly nonzero at the 1 per cent level. The coefficient of any dummy variable
for which the absolute value of the t statistic is less than 1.0 is restricted a priori to zero.








































Fabricatitin of yarn and
—39 fabrics
-21 Combed wool fabrics
—18 Carded wool fabrics
—13 Polyester yarn
—13 Combed wool yarn
—Il Dyed linen
4 Carded wool yarn
13 Cotton thread for
39 retail sale









































Implicit Tariff Rates (ITR) and Effective Protection Rates (EPR)
for 92 Products, 1967
(percent)
325






















Books, reprints, 20,000 vols.
Books, reprints, 3,000 vols.
14—21 Books, 1st ed., 20,000 vols.
Books, 2nd ed., 3,000 vols.
0—2518. Leather and leather products
Tanyard and finishing shops














































Basic industries of steel
and iron

















Winch (1.5 mm. X
180mm.)
Drill (column up to




Elect. engine, 5 HP,
1.500 RPM
27 29 Elect. engine, 2 HP,
1.500 RPM




































162780Sectors and Product ITREPR Sectora and Product ITREPR
Household food mixer





























370-ton barge 0—14 Range 3713,562
SOURCE: Estimates by de la Cuadra as presented in de Castro and de la Cuadra
[1971:38—46]. For details concerning the calculation of these rates, see the discussion of
ITR1 and EPR3 in Appendix B.





Correlation Coefficients Among Alternative Sets of Estimates of Implicit Tariff
Rates (ITRs), Effective Protection Rates (EPRs), and Domestic Resource
Costs (DRCs), 1961, 1967, and 1968
Domestic —
Implicit
Tariff Rates Effective Protection Rates
Resource
Costs
19611967 1968' 1961 1961 19671968'19611968'







































0.71 0.79 —0.51 1.00
1.00
Sousca: Table 5.3contains the underlying data. In the calculation of each correla-
tion coefficient, the maximum number of sectors possible is included after all the blanks
in Table 5.3 have been excluded. This table includes only correlation coefficients signifi-
caraly nonzero at the S per cent level. Of course the matrix of correlation coefficients is
symmetric but both halves are included to make the table easier to read.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes to Table A .5
a. The column headings refer to those of Table 5.3. The sectoral economic variables
are from the following sources: 1957 manufacturing census data from DEC [l960a:42—
43, 70—71, 95—96,106—107,131—1321 and Instituto de EconomIa [1963:100, 103—104],
1957industrialconcentration data from Lagos [1966:80, 96, 97, 170], 1961/1953 pro-
duction from data in Instituto de EconomIa [1963:90], 1961 average tariff rate on inter-
mediate imported inputs from unpublished data calculated by Jeanneret and presented in
Bacha and Taylor [19731, related data of 1962 input-output table from ODEPLAN
[1970], 1967 manufacturing census data from INE [1970:19—80], and 1967 data calcu-
lated by de Ia Cuadra and presented in de Castro and de Ia Cuadra [1971:38—44]. All
correlation coefficients which are significantly nonzero at least at the S per cent level are
included. Sectoral characteristics for which correlation coefficients were calculated but
which were in no case significantly correlated with the variables indicated in the column
headings include value added per unit of capital and the ratio of capital to gross value of
output for 1957; firm size, firm size plus degree of concentration, and concentration by
gross value of output for 1957; the change in concentration of the labor force between
1937 and 1957; the ratio of investment goods of domestic origin to domestic production
and the ratios of intermediate goods of foreign origin and of government-consumed
goods of foreign origin to imports from the 1962 input-output table; the ratios of the
capital stock, of the horsepower capacity, of plant, and of electric energy consumed to
gross product, the average tariff rate on intermediate inputs, and the ratio of value added
to capital for 1967; capital per worker and the ratio of intermediate imports to gross
product for 1967 relative to 1957; and the 1967-to-l962 ratios of gross product and of
gross value added.
b. For exports only.






Correlations Between Selected Sectoral Economic Variables and 1967-to-1961









Plant! total capital —.64
Value added/capital —.49
Capital per worker .69
1957 industrial concentration: labor force
1961/1953 product .49
1962 input-output table .44
Import ratios
Private consumption .49 —.46
Government .55
Components of gross value added/domestic production:
imported inputs .53
1967 manufacturing census: value added/domestic
production —.47





Labor payments/gross product .47
Capacity in horsepower .47
Value added .55
Plant/total capital .82
SOURCE: SeeTables5.3 and A.5.
a. Only coefficients that are significantly nonzero at the 5 per cent level are shown.
ITR2 and EPR3 are for 1967; ITR1 and EPR2 are for 1961. However, it is assumed in
these comparisons that there are no empirically significant definitional differences be-
tween ITR1 and ITR2 and between EPR2 and EPR3. See Appendix B for definitions and
for a discussion of the importance of the differences in definition.334 APPENDIXA
TABLE A.7
Chilean Average Annual Nominal and Effective Exchange Rates, 1931—72













Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I—I'
1931 .00826
1932 .01405 .03338 0.025e
1933 .01334 .03318 0.034C
1934 .00964 .02507 0.025
1935 .01933 .02426 0.025
1936 .01938 .02605 .035e 0.028
1937 .01937 .02558 .034e .028 0.026
1938 .01937 .02495 Ø34e .028 0.027
1939 .01937 .02498 .031 0.032
1940 .01937 .02498 .031 0.033
1941 .01937 .02490 .031 0.032
1942 .01937 .02500 .031 0.032
1943 .01937 .02500 .031 0.032
1944 .01937 .02500 .031
0.032
.01937 .02500 .031 0.034
1947 .01937 .02500 .031 0.047
1948 .01937 .02500 .031 0.061
1949 .01937 .02500 .1236 .031 0.075
1950 .01937 .1367 .031 0.092
1951 .01937 .1345 .110 .031 0.090
1952 .01937 .1647 .133 .031 0.122
1953 .01937 .1896.170 .05175 0.188
1954 .245 .110 0.335
1955 .01937 .350 .110 0.565
III
1956 .01937 .110 0.526
1957 .110 0.800

































































































(specialExport (parity after Black or
Phase andafter 1942)Draft Gold WineDec. 1946)&Free Marketb



































(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
1.047 1.045 1.055 1.049 1.254
1.051 1.049 1.051 1.049 1.269
1.051 1.049 1.051 1.049 1.292
1.142 1.142 1.751 1.153 1.455
1.875 2.452 1.874 3.011 1.871 2.293
2.372 2.741 2.373 3.204 2.418 2.850
3.128 3.310 3.131 3.739 3.237 3.847
3.955 4.000 3.955 4.649 4.000 4.711
















SOURCE: The black-market rates for 1931—71 are from Baerresen [1969:17] and
Pick's [1948—71]; for 1972, from verbal reports. The national accounts rate is from
CORFO and ODEPLAN sources as presented in Mamalakis [1971b:527] for 1931—39
and in Behrman [1974] for 1940—71. The gold and wine rates are from Ellsworth [1945:
56—57]and Baerresen [1969: 12]. All other data are from Central Bank sources and are
largely presented in Jul [1969:149—150] and in Libano [1970:7301. Before 1960 the
Chilean currency was the peso, which equaled 0.00 1 escudos.
a. After June 1959, calculations of the IMF for Chilean reserves and balance of
payments have been based on the bank rate.
b. End of June for 1948—72. The black-market NER is the EER for nonbulk mar-
ginal goods, services, and capital transactions. The black-market rate approximates the
EER and not the NER for such transactions because tariffs, taxes, and other charges
generally are avoided in those cases in which the black market is the source of foreign
exchange. There may be a cost due to risk, however, because of the illegality of dealing
in this market.
The black-market rate must be interpreted with care because this market is some-
what narrow (although information about it seems to be widespread in the commercial
centers of Santiago and Valparaiso), and may be affected by risk aversion because of its
illegality. Risk aversion would shift both the demand and the supply curves downward.
The direction of the effect on the price of foreign exchange would be uncertain. One
might hypothesize that the supply curve would shift less than the demand curve, since
suppliers in this market are largely foreigners for whom the penalties arising from con-
victions for operating in this market have been less than for nationals. On the other
hand, the probability of arrest for black-market operations may be higher for the more
visible foreigners than for nationals, which would have a countervailing effect. In any
case, attempts to suppress the black market in any manner (except for lessening the
degree of overvaluation in the legal market) have been very infrequent—especially before
the Allende government. The black-market PLD-NER--—or the discrepancy1between it
and the comparable legal rate—is one useful index of the extent to which demands for
foreign exchange are not being satisfied in the legal market(s) because quantitative re-
strictions are being used to ration the available foreign exchange at the existing over-
valued legal rate(s).
The following regression provides some support for this interpretation (t ratios are
shown in parentheses; elasticities at sample means, in brackets):
PLD-NER5M = 29.7 QRFD + 0.113 — —23.5
(3.8) (4.2) (3.2)
[5.2] [0.11
R2 = 0.84, SE = 0.532, DW1.3; years covered, 1950—65
where
BMblack market;
NA = national accounts;
QRFD = Ffrench-Davis quantitative restrictions index (line 1.2.6.2 in Table Al);
Lfirst year of start of last stabiizatiop plus liberalization attempt (1956, 1959,
1965).
Variations in QRFD alone are consistent with 65 per cent of the variance in the PLD-
NERBU. The second term on the right is the sum of the difference between the PLD-NERs
.STATISTICAL TABLES 339
forthe black market and for the legal market(s) since the initiation of the last attempt
at stabilization with liberalization. It represents the cumulative pressures for another lib-
eralization attempt due to the disequilibrium system and, thus, motivation for speculative
capital flight. (A somewhat different interpretation of the regression is possible. The
second term may represent a distributed lag of the quantitative restrictions index. In such
a case the entire right-hand side is a distributed lag of this index, which may represent
expectations concerning future quantitative restrictions.) Together the two right-hand
variables are consistent with 84 per cent of the variance in the (Prima
facie, the elasticities may be misleading indicators of the relative contribution of the two
right-hand variables because the coefficient of variation is much larger for the second
than for the first of the two.) The inclusion of additional variables does not significantly
increase the correlation.
c. Weighted average of legal exchange rates. For 1971, it is a weighted average of
p the bank market and brokers' market rates described in notes f and g.
d. The EER for imports is the national accounts exchange rate adjusted to include
the average import tax rate (line 1.2.6.9 in Table A.l) and the import prior-deposit-cost
rate calculated from prior-deposit cost estimates made by Ffrench-Davis [1971:2691.
e. End of year. EER for imports is the average number of escudos paid for a one-
dollar international transaction, including all charges for tariffs and other taxes and the
interest costs of prior deposits. The figures shown are in each case the higher (by 0.0005)
oftwo rates for gold.
f. As of December 13, 1971, the bank market ratewas subdivided into four rates:
A at 12.21 escudos per dollar, B at 15.80, C at 19.00, and D at 25.00. As of August 7,
-r 1972, the escudo under these rates was devalued and three new lists were added so that
the stnicture became the following: A or E at 20.00 escudos per dollar, B or F at 25M0,
V G at 30.00, C at 40.00, D at 80.00, and higher rates for nontraditional exports deemed
desirable. The rate in the table is the weighted average of the two basic B rates.
g. The rate of 28.00 escudos per dollar, which was established in July 1971, was
replaced by three rates as of August 2, 1972: Area I, 36.00; Area II, and Area HI,
85.00. The rate indicated in the table is the weighted average of the 28.00-escudo rate



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NOTE: To calculate EERs on a disaggregated level for Chile is very difficult. In
attempts by the government to pursue stabilization and distribution goals in an environ-
ment with very high inflation rates (cf. line 2.1 in Table A.1), foreign-sector policies
have been changed with great frequency—and often with great specificity (see Part II,
above). To trace the changes in the implicit legal charges related to international trans-
actions on a detailed level, therefore, is an enormous task.
Even if one had adequately chronicled such legal changes, however, a person would
not really have EERs because of the large number of exemptions. Many of these exemp-
tions are very difficult to detect, as the following anecdote illustrates: An apparently
innocuous three-day suspension of the duties on sugar resulted in a considerable premium
to the importer because a shipfull of sugar was waiting for the suspension in the Va!-
paraiso harbor. During those three days, the cargo was unloaded and passed through
customs. A quantity of sugar equal to a considerable portion of Chilean annual consump- f
tion entered the country duty-free. (In an interview on May 17, 1972, Ana Maria Jul
related this and other similar events she had uncovered in Central Bank interviews as
part of her research on Chilean international economic policies.)
For 1962, more specific evidence of the importance of such exemptions is available.
For that year, I compared the tariff-equivalent rates implied by the legal rates plus prior.
deposit costs for 58 categories of goods (Beca, Galvez, and Imperatore [1969:125—126])
with the tariff-equivalent rates actually paid on the same items. The unweighted mean of
the actual rates equaled 55 per cent of the mean of the legal rates; the entire difference
can be accounted for by the exemptions. The dispersion of the actual rates, as measured
by the standard deviation or by the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, is much
smaller than for the legal rates. A regression of the actual rates on the legal rates follows:
Actual rates =0.245legal rates + 0.348
(6.5) (5.2)
R' =0.44,SE =0.37
Note that the dispersion of the actual rates is much smaller than that of the legal rates.
Exemptions apparently substantially reduce the distortions implied by the legal rate struc-
ture. Therefore, the legal rates are quite misleading.
Because of the problems just described, time series for premium-inclusive EERs
[EER(Pl)s] rather than disaggregated EERs are presented in this study. The former are
defined to be the ratio of domestic prices (net of normal distribution costs) to c.i.f. prices.
EER(PI)s are equal to EERs if the premium rate is zero (see Table A.l, note for line
1.1.6).
The PLD-EER(PI)s in this table are based on the following procedure:
i. For a number of aggregate domestic price indices and for the 220 most impor-
tant products underlying the Chilean consumer and wholesale price indices, comparable
intet-national price indices were located and examined critically. The most comparable
components of the U.S. wholesale price index, consumer price index, and GDP deflator
were chosen because all other alternatives were incomplete or unstable. In any case, in
1950—68, the United States provided 440 per cent of the value of Chilean imports from
the second-largest supplier country.
ii. Ratios of domestic to international prices were calculated for each of the Chilean
price indices for 1946—70.
iii. The time series were normalized to be consistent with the 1961 ratios of domes-
tic to c.i.f. price estimates of Jeanneret [1971]. For this base year, near the end of the
most liberal post-World War II phase, the import premium rate was relatively low.STATISTICAL TABLES 347
iv.The disaggregated series were averaged with equal weights to obtain the sub-
sectoral estimates and other aggregates.
v. All series were divided by the Chilean GDP deflator, with 1965 equal to 1.00.
The resulting series primarily reflect the combined patterns of PLD-EERs and import
premiums for production subsectors and various demand aggregates plus such factors as
changes in domestic distribution margins in percentage terms, in those cases in which the
consumer price index is used; changes in international shipping costs in percentage terms;
d changesin the relative quality of Chilean versus U.S. products; changes in the degree of
domestic market power; changes in product composition; and time lags in adjustment
between foreign and domestic prices. The variances in these additional factors appear to
be dwarfed, however, by the variances in the PLD-EERs and the import premiums.
SOURCE: All series are based on aggregations of 220 underlying disaggregated series,
b unlessotherwise noted. Data sources include the Council of Economic Advisers [1972]
for the U.S. price indices and deflators; Jeanneret [1971] for the 1961 domestic-to-c.i.f.
price ratios; Behrman [1974] for the Chilean GDP deflator; and Banco Central [1945—
73b], Behrman [1974], and DEC [1957—70b1 for the Chilean price indices and deflators.
The means and standard deviations are for all nonzero observations.
a. Numerator based on Chilean GDP deflator.
b. Includes industries identified in columns 1, 12—14, and 16—19 (subsectors 1, 19—
21, 23, 24, 26, and 28 in the classification by ODEPLAN [1970] and Jeanneret [1971:
159]).
c. Includes industries identified in columns 2, 3, 5—11, and 15 (subsectors 2, 3, 9, 10,
12—14, 16, 18, and 22 in the classification used by ODEPLAN [1970] and Jeanneret
[1971:159]).
d. Based on imported raw materials component of Chilean wholesale price index.
. ,1. Agriculture &
forestry (1)
2. Fishin.g (2)








































































Correlation Coefficients aAmongPrice-Level-Deflated Effective Exchange Rates,




















.70 .90.64.83.89 .78 1.00












.40 .74.73 .70 .60.87.89.79
I
F,
a. Includes all correlation coefficients among the series in Table A.8 that are sig-
nificantly nonzero at the 5 per cent level. The results indicate the consistency of the









The industiy numbers in the column headings are identified in the stub. The figures in
parentheses are the sector numbers used by ODEPLAN [1972] and Jeanneret (1971].

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ex Post General-Equilibrium Elasticities of Important Economic Variables in Chile
with Respect to Changes in Foreign-Sector Factors





Line No. Variables 1 3 1 3
1. Balance of payments
1.1 Exports —.03—.01 .1 .2
1.1.1 Agricultural —.08—.19 .5 .4
1.1.2 Mineral
1.1.2.1 Large-scale —.03—.01 .2 .2
1.1.2.2 Other —.05—.01 .0ml
1.1.3 Industrial .12 .15 —.2 .5
1.1.4 Services —.03—.03 .0 —.0
1.2 Imports .03—.02 .2 .1
1.2.1 Consumption
1.2.1.1 Staple —.05—.01 —.1 —.1
1.2.1.2 Durable —.09—.20 —.1 —.0
1.2.1.3 Secondary .12 .31 —.4 —.7
1.2.2 Investment
1.2.2.1 Machinery and equip. —.00—.05 .0 .4
1.2.2.2 Transport. related .06—.04 .1 —.1
1.2.3 Intermediate .12—.00 .7 .2
1.2.4 Services .06 .03 .4 .2
1.3 Other
1.3.1 Surplus on current acct." — .31 .02 —1.1 .4
1.3.2 Net bank intl. reservest' — .23—.22 .1 .2
1.3.3 Govt. deficit financed abroad' —.95—.10 —92.2 4.3
1.3.4 Black-market rate .06—.02 .3 —.1
2. Cyclical fluctuations
2.1 Real capacity utilization —.01—.00 .0 .1
2.2 Price stability
2.2.1 GDP deflator —.01 .02 .3 —.1
2.2.2 Money supply —.07—.01 .2 —.0
2.2.3 Monetary base —.12—.07 .1 .2
2.2.4 Govt. deficit —.09—.01 —.4 .3
2.2.5 Net central bank foreign reservest' —.35—.32 .1 .3
3. Resource allocation
3.1 Product/intermediate input price
3.1.1 Agriculture .08—.03 .1 .2
3.1.2 Mining .02—.03 .6 .1
3.1.3 Industry —.01—.03 —.1 .1
.STATISTICAL TABLES 357





1.2All Indus. Prod. Legal Exch. 2.1.2Brokers& Taylor Equi.
Imports Index Rates Market Rate librium Rates















































































































































































































































































Line No. Variables 1 3 1 3



























Agriculture — .08—.08 — .0 —.0
3.4.2 Mining — .07—.06 .0 .0










3.5.3 Industry .05 .03 .1 .3
3.5.4 Goods/services — .01 —.03 .2 .2
4. Distribution of income and resources
4.1 Factoral
4.1.1 Real wage .02 .05 — .1 —.3
4.1.1.1 Agriculture .04 .03 — .1 —.4
4.1.1.2 Mining —.02—.06 —.2 —.2
4.1.1.3 Industry —.08—.07 —.2 —.4
4.1.1.4 Government .04—.07 —.2 —.2
4.1.2 Wage share in income .04 .11 —.2 —.4
4.2 International
4.2.1 Net factor income from abroadb .07—.19 —1.0 .0
4.3 Intertemporal




Taxes/deflator — .03—.00 .1 .1









S. Economic growth-related variables
5.1 GDP —.00—.01 .0 .1
5.2 Gross national savingsb — .08 .01 .1 .2
5.2.1 Personal' —.461.06 —1.9—95.3
.5.2.2 Business' — .42—.90 3.856.6
5.2.3 Governmentb .32—.03 .7 —.3
5.3 Capacity — .01 .01 .0 .0
5.3.1 Investment .04 .01 .0 .1




















Imports Index Rates Market Rate librium Rates
r
1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
i —.0 —.0 —.0—.0 —.0 —.0 —.0 .0 —.00—.02
—.0 .0 —.0 .0 —.0 .0 —.0 .0 —.00 .01
—.0 —.1 —.0 —.1 —.0 —.1 —.0 .0
—.1 —.0 —.0—.0 —.0 .1 —.0 .0 —.01 —.01
—.0 .3 .0—.0 .0 —.0 .0 .1 .01 .12
.1 —.0 —.0 —.1 —.0 —.1 —.0 .0 —.01 —.05
—.0 —.0 —.0—.0 —.0 —.0 —.0 .0 —.00—.02
p
.0 —.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .00 .00
—.0 —.1 —.0 —.1 —.0 —.1 —.0 .0 —.00—.06 .
— .2 —.0 .1 —.0 .0 .2 .0 .1 .00 .09 .
—.5 —.1 .0 —.0 .1 —.0 —.0 .1 .05 .14
— .2 —.1 .1 —.1 —.0 .2 .0 .1 —.02 .05
— .2 —.2 .1 —.1 .1 .0 .0 .1 .02 .06
—.4 —.4 —.1 .1 —.4 —.5 —.0 —.1 —.10—.23
—.3 —.5 —.1 .2 —.4 —.5 —.0 —.1 —.13—.19
—.5 —.3 —.2 .0 —.3 —.6 —.1 —.0 —.08—.26 .
—.3 —.4 —.1 .2 —.4 —.5 —.1 —.1 —.09—.22
—.5 —.4 —.2 .1 —.4 —.5 —.1 —.0 —.09—.20
—.2 —.5 —.1 .1 —.3 —.7 —.1 —.1 —.10—.17
—1.4 —.6 —.6 —.1 —1.8 —.8 —.2 .1 —.61 —.79
.1 —.0 —.0 .0 .0 —.0 —.0—.0 .00—.02 ..












.1 .1 —.0 .0 .0 —.2 — .0 .0 .02 —.03 .
—.2 .0 .0 —.0 —.0 .1 .0 .1 — .01 .04
—1.4 .4 .3 —.1 .2 .4 .0 .3 .05 .26
5.3 —122.8 —.725.4 —2.9 —151.8 —.4 —13.4 —.81 —51.63
7.8 80.4 3.2 —20.3 8.2 91.7 1.217.0 2.2836.92
—1.7—1.0 —.2 .7 —.5 —.4 —.2 .0 —.17—.28
.0 .0 —.0 —.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .00 —.00
— .0 .2 .0 —.2 .0 .0 .0 .0 .00 —.01
— .0 .0 .0 —.0 .0 —.0 .0 .0 .00 —.01


































1.1.2.1 Large-scale .01 .02 — .7
1.1.2.2 Other .00 .00 .0 .7
1.1.3 Industrial .11 .06 —8.9 4.0
1.1.4 Services .01 .01 —.9 —.3
1.2 Imports .00 .01 —2.4 —.1
1.2.1 Consumption
1.2.1.1 Staple —.01 .01 —3.2 .2
1.2.1.2 Durable .01 .01 —2.2 —1.8




Machinery and equip. — .00 .00 —1.4 — .9
1.2.2.2 Transport. related — .00—.01 —4.2 1.8
1.2.3 Intermediate .01 .01 — .4 .3




Surplus on current acct.b









1.3.3 Govt. deficit financed abroadb 4.18—.16 101.4 —6.2
1.3.4 Black-market rate —.03—.01 8.0 2.6
2. Cyclical fluctuations
2.1 Real capacity utilization .01 .00 .1 .2
2.2 Price stability
2.2.1 GDP deflator —.03 — .01 1.6 1.5
2.2.2 Money supply .00 .01 1.0 1.5
2.2.3 Monetary base .01 .03 .5 .6
2.2.4 Govt. deficit .02 — .01 .4 — .4
2.2.5 Net central bank foreign reservesb .02 .05 1.0 1.9
3. Resource allocation
3.1 Product/intermediate input price
3.1.1 Agriculture .00 .01 .4 .7
3.1.2 Mining .02 .01 —.8 —1.0
3.1.3 Industry — .00 — .00 — .6 — .9
S .- .International EconomicPolicy (continued)
Restrictions







10% for Agric. and
Indus. Exports







































































































































































3.5.1 Agriculture .01 .01 1.0 .7
3.5.2 Mining .01 .01 —.5 .6
3.5.3 Industry .01 .01 .8 1.5
3.5.4 Goods/services .00 .01 .8 1.4
4. Distribution of income and resources
4.1 Factoral
4.1.1 Real wage .02 .01 —1.1 —2.7
4.1.1.1 Agriculture .01 .00 —.9 1.9
4.1.1.2 Mining .02 .01 —1.6 4.4
4.1.1.3 Industry .02 .00 1.4 '3.4
4.1.1.4 Government .02 .01 —1.5 —3.0
4.1.2 Wage share in income .01 .01 —1.2 —3.1
4.2 International
4.2.1 Net factor income from abroadb .06 .02 —4.0 —5.8
4.3 Intertemporal
4.3.1 Consumption/product —.01 —.00 —.1 .2
4.4 Public vs. private
4.4.1 Taxes/deflator .01 .01 — .9 —.7
4.4.1.1 Import —.09 .01 —4.1 —1.9





— .01 —.00 — .5 —1.0
5.1 GDP .01 .00 .1 .2
5.2 Gross national savingsb .07—.00 —1.0 —1.6
5.2.1 .252.22 —15.6 —1030.5
5.2.2 Businessa —.21—1.44 34.4414.2
5.2.3 Governmentb — .02 .03 —2.7 —1.0
5.3 Capacity .00 .00 .0 .0
5.3.1 Investment —.00 .01 —1.3 1.5
5.3.2 Capital stock — .00 .00 — .1 —.1





































































































.05 .08 .09 .40 —.01 —.01


























































































































































































































— .00 .01 .7 — .0 .00 — .03
—.00 .01 .1 .6 .00 — .08
— .00 .01 1.0 .0 .00 .00
.00 .00 1.0 .0 .00 — .02
.00 .02 — .7 — .2 — .00 — .26
— .00 .00 .1 — .2 .00 — .01





















































No. Variables 1 3 1 3



























































4. Distribution of income and resources
4.1 Factoral









4.1.1.3 Industry — .1 —.3 .00—.00
4.1.1.4 Government — .2 —.1 • .00 —.00
4.1.2
4.2
Wage share in income
International
— .1 —.4 —.00 —.00




Consumption/product — .0 —.0 —.00 —.00
4.4 Public vs. private -
4.4.1 Taxes/deflator — .0 .0 — .00 .00
4.4.1.1 Import —.1 —.1 .00—.00





— .0 —.0 — .00 —.00
5.1 GDP .0 .1 .00 .00
5.2 Gross national savingsb .3 .3 .03 .00
5.2.1 Personala —.8—72.2 .05—1.00
5.2.2 Businessa 3.248.4 .05 .59






























2.6.3Invest- 2.6.4Mining Internal Financing
ment x1.1 Exports of Govt. Deficit
1 3 1 3 1 3
—.00 —.00 —.0 —.1 —.00 —.01
— .00 .00 — .0 .0 — .00 .00
—.00 —.00 —.0 —.1 —.00 —.02
—.00 —.00 —.0 .1 —.00 —.02
.06 .05 .1 .2 .00 —.01
—.00 —.00 —.0 —.1 —.00 —.01
—.00 —.00 —.0 —.1 —.00 —.01
.00 .00 .0 .0 .00 .00
—.00 —.00 —.0 —.1 —.00 —.01 .:
.00 .01 .1 .3 .00 —.04
—.00 .01 .1 —.0 .00 —.01
.00 .01 .2 .4 .00 —.07
— .00 .00 .2 .2 .00 —.04
— .00 .00 — .3 —.5 — .00 .07
—.00 —.01 —.2 —.4 —.00 .13
— .01 .00 — .5 —.5 — .00 .04
—.01 —.00 —.4 —.5 —.00 .10
—.01 —.00 —.4 —.3 —.00 .05
—.00 —.00 —.3 —.3 —.00 .11
—.01 .02 —1.7 —.2 —.01 .04
—.00 —.00 —.1 —.0 .00 .01
— .00 .01 — .2 .0 .00 .00
—.00 .01 —.4 .0 —.00 .09
—.01 .02 —.4 —.3 .01 —.02
—.00 —.00 —.1 —.1 .00 .04
.00 .00 .0 .2 .00 —.03
.01 .02 .6 .4 .00 —.13
—.02 .97 —2.2—223.4 — .0220.00
.07 .25 8.4 81.1 .04—15.16
—.00 .02 — .8 —.1 .00 .08 •
.00 .00 .0 —.0 —.00 —.00
.03 —.00 .1 —.0 .00 —.07
.00 .00 .0 —.0 .00 —.00 I
p368 APPENDIXA
Notes to Table A.11
NOTE: The simulation period is 1962—64. All underlying data are in constant escudo
or index terms, except lines 1.3.2 and 2.2.5, which are in dollars; line 1.3.3, which is in
escudos per dollar; and lines 2.2.2—2.2.4, which are in escudos.
All simulations are dynamic in that lagged simulated values of endogenous variables
are used whenever it is possible to do so. Elasticities are defined as the ratio of the
percentage deviation from the base simulation values for the series listed on the left to
the percentage deviation from the base simulation values for the variables identified in the
column headings. Instead of elasticities, proportional deviations from the base simulation
(or, in the case of the base simulation itself, from the actual data) are given for those
simulations for which elasticities are not easy to define; those cases are identified in the
notes following.
For either elasticities or proportional deviations, those variables defined as differences
between two flows (lines 1.3.1—1.3.3, 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 4.2.1, and 5.2.1—5.2.3) have relatively
large deviations from the base simulation value. In all simulations except for columns
2.1.3, 2.2.1, 2.6.3, and 2.7.1, changes indicated in the column heading occurred only for
the first year of the simulation, and in all subsequent years, the variable assumed the base
simulation values.
Col. 2.1.3Bacha and Taylor [1973] estimate that the equilibrium rates for the first
three years of the simulation period equal the actual national accounts rate multiplied by
1.45, 1.35, and 1.61. The figures shown are the proportional deviations resulting from use
of these adjusted rates. The Bacha-Taylor derivation is based upon a Robinson-Metzler—
type model in which fiscal and monetary policies are not included explicitly (other than
foreign trade taxes), imports and exports depend only on their own prices, an attempt is
made to abstract from short-run cyclical effects, and the equilibrium exchange rate is de-
fined to be "that which prevails in a floating foreign exchange market where all import
restrictions and export subsidies are removed." The underlying price elasticities utilized
for these estimates are —2.0 for import demand, 3.0 for export supply, oo for import
supply, and —9.0 for export demand. (The absolute values of these import demand and
export supply elasticities seem surprisingly large in light of the estimates presented above
in Chapters 6 and 7. Bacha and Taylor claim that estimates of elasticities based on his-
torical data are biased downward because of the effects of quantitative restrictions and
uncertainty. However, attempts were made to include these effects in the estimation of the
functions presented in Tables 6.3 and 7.2.) The Bacha and Taylor partial-equilibrium
model clearly differs from the macroeconometric general-equilibrium model utilized in
this study in a number of important respects. Nevertheless, the consequences of utilizing
their equilibrium exchange rates within the present general-equilibrium model are of con-
siderable interest because of the consensus of a large group of economists that the Chilean
escudo was overvalued by the order of magnitude of the Bacha and Taylor estimates in
the 1960s: Jeanneret [1971: 165] estimates the ratio of the equilibrium to the actual rate to
have been 1.68 for 1961; Hachette [1966:50] estimates 1.45 for 1961 and 1.63 for 1962;
Selowsky [1970:41] gives 1.35 for the late 1960s; and Bacha and Taylor give 1.50, 1.40,
1.30, and 1.24 for 1965—68 and 1.25 for April 1969.
Col. 2.2.1The figures shown are proportional deviations from base simulations
resulting from multiplication of the tax function by 0.9 in the first year of the simulation.
To obtain elasticities with respect to the level of real import taxes, these proportional
deviations must be divided by —0.9.
Col. 2.3.1Each index is changed by the same deviation of 1 percent from the base
value, although for some of the indices (in particular, for the widely used Ffrench-Davis
index) such a change is relatively large in comparison to historical variations in the index.
Other variables in the model, e.g., the black-market exchange rate or the export capacity
to import, or various dummy variables, which also represent the effects of quantitative
restrictions are not changed exogenously, but some of these variables do change endoge-
• nously and substantially (see lines 1.3.2, 1.3.4, and 2.2.4).
Col. 2.3.2The proportional sectoral distribution of investment-goods imports is
assumed to deviate from that which actually prevailed on average from 1962 through
1966 toward an alternative which favors agriculture and mining at the expense of industry.STATISTICAL TABLES 369
Forall years of this simulation, the sectoral allocation of imported capital in propor-
tional terms is changed from 0.03 to 0.15 for agriculture, from 0.18 to 0.25 for mining,
from 0.37 to 0.18 for industry, from 0.16 to 0.17 for the rest of the industries combined,
except transportation (unchanged at 0.19) and utilities (unchanged at 0.06). Such im-
ports of capital goods are assumed to enter the sectoral investment functions with fixed
coefficients; i.e., the deviation from actual average investment imports allocated to a
specific sector, multiplied by a coefficient representing the average ratio of total to im-
Ie ported investment in the sector in 1962—66, is assumed to affect investment in that sector
directly by an additive term (the data used for calculating the sectoral ratios and the
average sectoral distribution of investment imports are from Meza [19671). In inter-
preting the results presented here, it should be kept in mind that the model is specified
so that an increment in capital stock during year tresults in an increment in capacity
only in the year i + 1. Therefore, the first-year impacts do not include a shift in the distri-
ly bution of capacities across sectors even though a shift in the distribution of investment
as does occur. Note also that the figures shown are proportional deviations from the base
•pr simulation, not elasticities.
Col. 2.3.1For this simulation, investment in large-scale mining was made exogenous
and held at the base value except for a 10 percent increase in the first year. Because of
the very low level of investment in large-scale mining in the first year, due to growing
dissatisfaction of Chile with the Nuevo Trato and of the foreign-owned mining companies
K with the failure of the Chilean government to provide long-term tax and exchange rate
guarantees and guarantees against expropriation (see subsection 4.2.1, above), a 10 per
In cent increase is not particularly large in absolute terms nor is the impact of this increment
.'IS particularly large.
Col. 2.4.1Theactual import prior-deposit cost rate was very low in 1962, and the
•it rate was therefore doubled in this simulation, from 0.0097 to 0.0194; the proportional
deviations shown are for this doubled rate.
• Col. 2.5.1The subsidy is at a rate equal to a 10 per cent increase in world prices for
Lu theseexports for the first year of the simulation. Since the change amounts to an infinite
increase in these subsidies relative to the zero base, elasticities cannot be defined. The
figures shown are proportional deviations from the base simulation.
Col. 2.6.2Function for average direct taxes from large-scale mining multiplied by
0.9. The figures shown are proportional deviations.
Col. 2.6.3Investment in large-scale mining is made exogenous at the base simulation
level except that the first-year value is multiplied by 1.10. The figures shown are propor-
— tionaldeviations.
Col. 2.6.4Exports from mining are made exogenous at the base simulation level
• except for a first-year change which is assumed directly to affect mining inventory levels.
Assumed changes in mining exports are based on an estimate of —4.0 for the price elas-
ticity of demand for Chilean copper. The figure of —4.0 is based on Chile's share of sales
in the world market and estimates of price elasticities in the world market for total world
demand and for supply from other countries. For example, see Racha and Taylor [1973]
or de Castro and de la Cuadra [1971:17].
p
Col. 2.7.1In each year, half of the government deficit beyond that financed by the
II banking system is assumed to be financed abroad. For all the other simulations, all
the changes in the government deficit from the base level are assumed to be financed
externally by a shift in the composition of capital movements between private and public
Is flows, reflecting the great dependence of Chile on foreign sources for such financing in
recent phases. Because the government deficit financed abroad in the first year of the base
simulation is so small, the change in method is applied in all three years of the simulation.
Since this change does not permit a meaningful interpretation of elasticity, proportional
I- deviations are shown.
a. Proportional deviations from actual values.
IS S. The very large values for this variable in some cases reflect the fact that the actual
value and, also, the base simulation value are very close to zero. Therefore, the sign of
















Used in Table 5.3
Inthis appendix, definitions and sources for the ITRs, EPRs, and DRCs in-
cluded in Table 5.3 are given, and then the empirical importance of some
definitional distinctions is explored.
B.1DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES
ITRI. Jeanneret [1971:153—159] estimated these 1961 rates by the following
steps. First, she classified the approximately 5,000 import items for July—
September 1961 in conformity with SITC categories and with the 1962 Chilean
input-output table. She then determined the tariff equivalent of various protec-
tive policies (including special regimes and prohibitive policies) on each item
and aggregated the individual-item tariff equivalents to the four-digit SITC
level by using domestic import weights. Finally, she further aggregated the
four-digit SITC level averages to the subsectoral level of the 1962 input-output
table by using world trade weights in order to lessen downward biases due to
import responses to the tariff structure.
Although problems exist in the underlying calculations because of a cer-
tain degree of arbitrariness in making various sets of data compatible and in
averaging and because of price differences that are due to quality differences,
this set of estimates is the most thorough and the best available for Chile.
ITR2. These estimates are unweighted arithmetic averages of the 92-item
estimates of de la Cuadra [1971] for 1967 (see Table A.3), who used the 1967
manufacturing census, customs data, and direct interviews with producers.1
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The 92 items include the most important products in each use category and at
least one representative item for each two-digit SITC industrial division. The
aggregation procedure introduces a bias of unknown direction.
ITR3. Bacha and Taylor [1973] averaged the tax rebate or drawback
rates for individual products in order to obtain ITRs for sectoral exports for
1968. The resulting estimates probably overstate average sectoral subsidies
because in many sectors very few products received drawbacks.2 Nevertheless,
they are the best available indicators of incentives for sectoral exports in the
late 1960s.
EPRI. Jeanneret [1971:159] calculated these estimates for 1961 from
ITR1 and from data in the ODEPLAN [1970] input-output table for 1962.
She calculated domestic net value added from the input-output data by sub-
tracting depreciation and indirect taxes minus subsidies from gross value added;
subtracting trade and transportation costs from both the output and input sides
in order to shift from user to producer prices; and adding the value added in
the production of nontraded inputs to the value added in the processing in-
dustry in question, following the Cordon [1966] procedure.
If, in fact, substantial substitution among intermediate inputs is possible,
the use of an input-output table based on 1962 data may lead to an under-
statement of the use of imported inputs because of the foreign-exchange crisis
of that year (see section 1.4). Unfortunately, no other Chilean input-output
study is yet available; so all the alternatives based on Chilean input-output
coefficients suffer from this same deficiency.
EPR2. Bacha and Taylor [1973] also started from the ITR1 for 1961 and
the input-output data for 1962. They corrected for specific differences between
world and domestic prices of intermediate-goods imports by utilizing unpub-
lished ODEPLAN data such as that in Table B. 1 under the assumption that no
arbitrage occurred.3 They based their estimates on the Hufbauer [1968] for-
mula, with gross value added supplemented by the value added of inputs of
nontradable goods as in the Cordon procedure.4
EPR3. These estimates are unweighted arithmetic averages of the 92-
item estimates of de Ia Cuadra [1971] for 1967 (Table A.3). The data sources
are the same as for ITR2. These rates are focused on gross value added. Non-
traded goods are assumed to be supplied at constant costs (or, equivalently,
the EPR on home goods is zero), as Balassa [1971:17—18, 321—325] has
recommended.5 The direction of bias due to the aggregation procedure is
unknown.°
EPR4. Bacha and Taylor [1973] calculated these estimates in the same
way as EPR2, except that the 1968 export-oriented ITR3s were used for the
final-product prices. Therefore, ITRs for inputs are assumed to be identical to
those in ITR1 for 1961, and the intermediate-input coefficients are assumed
to be the same as those in 1962. Since the size of sectoral subsidies is probablyI
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TABLE B.1
Ratios of Domestic Prices to c.i.f. Prices by Sectoral Destination







































22Nonmetallic minerals 2.30 2.87












Total 1.44 1.69 2.71
152].
SouRcE: Department of Social Accounts in ODEPLAN as presented in Jul [1969:
a. The sectoral numbers are those of ODEPLAN; see Table A.3. above. I
overstated in the ITR estimates (see below), effective protection for exports is
probably overestimated in EPR4.
DRCJ. Bacha and Taylor [1973] constructed these 1961 estimates from
ITR1, the 1962 input-output table, and average sectoral capital-output ratios
for 1962—1967; they assumed a shadow rate of return of 20 per cent on
capital.7
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DRC2. Bacha and Taylor [1973] calculated these estimates in the same
manner as those for DRC1 except that the 1968 export-oriented ITR3s were
used for the final-product prices. They assumed that the ITRs and interme-
diate-input coefficients have been stable since the early 1960s, as they did for
EPR4.
B.2 EMPIRICAL IMPORTANCE OF
SOME DEFINITIONAL DISTINCTIONS
B.2.1Aggregation Factors.
i.Guisinger and Schydlowsky [1971 :279] conclude that the consistency
between ITRs and EPRs increases as aggregation increases.8 In the limit, of
course, they must be correct in that the ITR is identical to the EPR at the one-
sector level of aggregation. A comparison of the correlation between ITR2 and
EPR3 with the correlation between the ITRs and EPRs in Table A.3 provides
a test of their claim because the former pair is only an aggregated version of
the latter. For the 28-sector aggregation the correlation coefficient is 0.50. For
the 92-product aggregation, the correlation coefficient is 0.52. Thus, this
example does not support the Guisinger and Schydlowsky conclusion.
ii. The Jeanneret estimates permit the exploration of the impact of
weighted versus unweighted averaging. In addition to the 28-sector estimates
in ITR1 and EPR1, Jeanneret presents 57-sector estimates in Balassa [1971:
66—67]. Unweighted averaging of the 57-sector estimates provides alternative
ITRs and EPRs at the 28-sector level that are identical to ITR1 and EPR1
except for the weights in the averaging. The more these alternative estimates
are correlated with ITR1 and EPR1, respectively, the less important is the
choice of the averaging procedure. In fact, this example suggests that the choice
of weights is quite important. For the ITRs, the correlation coefficient is 0.67,
which is significantly nonzero at the 5 per cent level, but which implies a sub-
stantially different cross-sectoral pattern. For the EPRs, the correlation coeffi-
cient is not significantly nonzero at the 5 per cent level.
• iii. Extreme values on a more disaggregate level may substantially affect
the cross-sectoral pattern on a more aggregate level. To investigate this possi-
bility, an alternative set of EPRs was constructed from Table A.3 by excluding
• the highest and lowest product estimates within each sector that had three or
more products. For the sectors so chosen, the correlation between this alterna-
• tive set of EPRs and EPR3 is 0.99. Thus, the estimated sectoral averages are
about the same whether or not the underlying extreme individual product rates
• are included.
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B.2.2Variations in EPR Definitions.
i.Balassa and Cordon have emphasized the importance of alternative
treatments of nontraded inputs (see EPR 1 and EPR3 in section B. 1). Jean-
neret [1971: 159] presents alternative EPR estimates which are identical to
EPR 1 except that the Balassa procedure is followed. The range and the stan-
dard deviations are somewhat smaller for the estimates based on the Cordon
formula. The correlation coefficient between the two sets of estimates, however,
is 1.00. In respect to the cross-sectoral pattern, therefore, the distinction in the
treatment of nontradable goods does not seem to be important.
ii. Lewis and Guisinger [1968] criticize EPR definitions in which the
difference between domestic and international value added is compared to in-
ternational value added because such definitions (under the assumption that
international value added is positive) give an EPR which is bounded by —1.0
as domestic value added approaches zero. For small values of domestic value
added relative to international value added, in other words, quite large pro-
portional differences in domestic value added imply very little change in the
EPR. Therefore, Lewis and Guisinger propose that the difference between
domestic and international value added be compared to domestic value added,
not to international value added.9 Bacha and Taylor [1973] present a set of
EPR estimates which is identical to EPR2 except for this change. De la
Cuadra [1971] likewise presents an alternative set of EPR estimates which is
identical to EPR3 except for this change. In both cases the correlation co-
efficient between the estimates in Table 5.3andthe alternatives with domestic
value added in the denominator is 0.81.'° The implications of such an alterna-
tive for cross-sectoral patterns in these two cases, therefore, do seem to be
significant, but not overwhelmingly so.
iii. The distinctions between EPR1 and EPR2 are primarily two. First,
•
EPR1 is based on net value added, while EPR2 is constructed from gross value
• added because the depreciation estimates are questionable. Second, EPR2 in-
corporates information about varying ITRs for different end uses (i.e., lower
rates for intermediate inputs), but EPR1 does not. The impact of these two
differences is quite substantial. Apparently because of the use of the more gross
measure, the EPR2 estimates vary much less across sectors than do the EPRI
estimates. For EPR2, the range and standard deviation are 4.88 and 1.17. For
EPRI, the corresponding figures are 28.98 and 5.52.Moreover,the correla-
tion coefficient between the two sets of estimates, while significantly nonzero
• at the 5percent level, is relatively low—O.43 (Table A.4).S
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B.2.3Variations in DRC Definitions. S
Bacha and Taylor [1973] present alternative sets of DRC estimates which
are identical to DRC 1 and DRC2, respectively, except that the sectoral returns
on capital implied by the input-output data are utilized instead of a 20 per cent
shadow rate. The effects of this alternative treatment of the returns on capital
are quite substantial. The alternative DRC estimates vary much less across
sectors. For the alternative to DRC1, the range and standard deviation across
sectors are 3.15 and 0.74 compared to 21.09 and 5.98 for DRC 1 itself. For
the alternative to DRC2, the range and standard deviation across sectors are
0.30 and 0.10 compared to 3.39 and 0.86 for DRC2. Moreover, the patterns
across sectors are substantially different. The correlation coefficient between
DRC1 and its alternative is 0.73, and that between DRC2 and its alternative is
0.53. The use of the proper definition of the return on capital, therefore, is of
substantial empirical importance.
B.2.4Consistency Among the Alternative Measures.
i. Cohen [1971:139] concludes that "one learns a lot—but not every-
thing" about the EPR structure by looking at the ITR structure. He finds that
in 15 of the 26 cases that he examined the ITR structure could predict more
than half of the variance in the EPRs and that 23 of the 26 relevant correla-
tion coefficients were significantly nonzero at the 1 per cent level. The impli-
cation of the estimates in tables 5.3 and A.4 is that in the Chilean case less is
learned about the EPR structure from the ITRs than Cohen found on the
average in his 26 cases. Two of the four correlation coefficients are significantly
nonzero at the 1 per cent level, and in only two of the four cases could the ITR
structure predict more than half of the variance in the For Chile, there-
fore, the returns to the additional work involved in calculating EPRs are higher
than Cohen claims is the case generally.
ii. Under strong assumptions, ITRs, EPRs, and DRCs imply the same
shadow price of foreign exchange.12 Not surprisingly, those special conditions
did not exist in Chile in the 1960s. Despite their absence, the extent to which
the alternative measures are consistent in their variations across sectors is an
interesting question. The off-diagonal blocks of correlation coefficients in Table
A.4 provide an answer. If one includes all elements in these blocks, the answer
is, "Not very consistent." Of the 26 relevant correlation coefficients, only 5 are
positive and significantly nonzero at the 5 per cent level and for only 3 pairs
would one set of estimates predict as much as half of the variance in the other.
This conclusion, however, reflects more the changes in the regime over time
that are discussed in Part II than intermeasure differences.12 Among the 9
coefficients for which both sets in the pair refer to the same year, in fact, con-NOTES
I. De Ia Cuadra is not clear about the dates of the interviews but the timing of his
writing is consistent with interviews as late as 1970, when the international economic
regime was more liberal than in 1967.
2. On the basis of Jul's [1969] study, moreover, thereis doubt that drawbacks
equaled the difference between domestic and f.o.b. prices as generally as Bacha and
Taylor claim. The existence of some effective quotas (especially for agricultural goods),
for example, implies that the drawback rates overstated incentives to export.
3. The assumption of no arbitrage among end uses may not be as strong as it seems
on the face of it because in many sectors the goods for intermediate use are quite distinct
from those for consumption or investment use.
4. However, they made no attempt to distinguish between tradable and nontradable
inputs used in earlier stages for the production of nontradable goods.
5. The Balassa treatment of nontradable goods tends to overstate the cost of such
goods at world prices, and to underestimate value added in world prices and to over-
estimate effective protection of domestic value added. However, the results in section
B.2 below indicate that the choice between the Cordon and the Balassa treatments
of nontradable goods makes little empirical difference.
6. Basevi [19711 and Tumlir and Till [1971] discuss some of the relevant considera-
tions for such aggregation. The discussion below, in section B.2, suggests that the ex-
clusion of extreme values before aggregating does not significantly affect the cross-
sectional pattern.
7. The studies by Bitar and Trivelli [1971] and Taylor [1973a], however, suggest that
the shadow rate of return on capital in Chile may have been somewhat lower than 20
per cent in the l960s.
8. Guisinger and Schydlowsky find a consistent pattern without exceptions for eight
countries, including Chile. For Chile, on a 10-sector level of aggregation, they report a
coefficient of determination (corrected for degrees of freedom?) of 0.81. For 56 sectors,
they report a coefficient of determination of 0.56. This comparison is based on partially
unpublished estimates by Jeanneret.
9. If E1 is the EPR with domestic value added in the denominator and E2 is the
EPR with international value added in the denominator, then the relationship between
E1 and E2 is E1 =E1/(l+ E1). If E1 is zero, E2 also is zero. If E1 is not zero but is
greater than —1.0, E9 is less than E,, but has the same sign. As E, approaches —1.0 from
above (i.e., domestic value added approaches zero), E2 approaches positive infinity. If
E, is less than —1.0 (i.e., if either domestic or international value added is negative, but
not both), E2 is positive.
10. On the 92-product level of Table A.4, however, the correlation coefficient is
somewhat lower—O.59.
11. Table A.4 contains correlation coefficients for 28 sectors. The correlation co-
efficient is 0.52 for the 92-product aggregation. The square of the correlation coefficient
indicates the extent which one set of estimates is consistent with the variance in another.
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siderably greater consistency is found. Five of these coefficients are positive
and significantly nonzero at the 5percent level. In their case, estimates for one








12. Krueger El972a:54] demonstrates that DRCs and EPRs are identical if "(1) all 4
goodsare traded (or tradable); (2) there are no transportation costs; (3) factors of
production are perfectly mobile within the domestic economy but perfectly immobile
internationally; and (4) all domestic markets are perfectly competitive." However, as
Balassa and Schydlowsky [1972:67) note, the first assumption is redundant given the
second assumption. The purpose of the fourth assumption presumably is to eliminate any
discrepancies between market and shadow prices, but would seem to require the explicit
assumption of no externalities in addition to that of perfect competition. In any case,
there is no reason why in principle shadow prices could not be used instead of market
prices for EPR calculations as well as for DRCs if that would better serve the purpose
of the estimation.
ITRs and EPRs, of course, become identical if there are no intermediate inputs or
if the nominal protection on the intermediate inputs is identical to that on the final
product.
13. The lack of significant coefficients among elements in the on-diagonal blocks
(which refer to intrameasured differences primarily because of the different timing of
the estimates) also suggest this qualification. Among the 10 relevant correlation co-
efficients, only 2 are positive and significantly nonzero at the 5percent level, and in no










C.1 A SIMPLE KEYNESIAN MODEL
Consider the following simple Keynesian model: 1











M*—= m(i,Y); m4 <0, my> 0 (C.S)
p
• T= T(Y,M,X,7r); Ty>0,TM>0, T1>0,T,,< 0 •(C.9)
• S=p'X—pMM +F(i,q);F4> 0,Fq0 (C.10)
379r
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C. Iis an instantaneous production function for the output of a single
good (Y). The inputs are services from labor (L) and the stock of capital (K).
The production function is assumed to be characterized by positive but dimin-
ishing marginal products and a positive dependence of the marginal product of
capital on employment. As is characteristic of all analysis, the
equilibrium of the economy is considered for a period of time so short that the
growth of capital is ignored.
C.2 is the demand for labor under the assumption that firms are perfectly
competitive in the labor market. Therefore, they hire labor until its marginal
product (YL) equals the real wage (w/p), where w = nominal wage and p =
domestic price level; w is assumed to be given at a point in time because there
are strong unions in part of the modern sector; because a condition similar in (
itseffect to an "unlimited supply of labor" prevails in the traditional sector; £
and because of government wage policies.
C.3 states that consumption (C) depends on perceived disposable in-
come and the real rate of interest (i —wherei = nominal interest rate and
= expected rate of inflation. Perceived disposable income is equal to
the real value of wage payments (Lw/p) plus dividend payments, under
the assumption that there are no retained earnings (Y —Lw/p—BK),minus
taxes net of government transfers (T) minus the perceived rate of capital loss
on the real value of the public's net claims on the government due to expected
inflation [(M*+B)ir/p]. These net claims consist of the nominal money sup-
ply (Me) and the nominal value of variable-coupon government bonds (B).
This disposable income concept measures the amount of income that the public
expects it could consume and still leave the real value of the sum of its paper
and physical assets intact.
C.4 describes the aggregate net investment behavior of firms given that
there is no market for existing stocks of capital. The assumed behavior is a
neoclassical response to the difference between the marginal product of capital
(Yff) and the cost of capital.2 The cost of capital depends on the rate of interest d
on bonds (1), the rate of physical depreciation of capital (8), and the antici-
pated rate of increase of prices of newly produced capital goods (ir).
C.5is an import function. Imports (M) are assumed to be positively re-
lated to income (Y) and the domestic price level (p) and negatively related to
the exchange rate in terms of escudos per dollar (x), the c.i.f. price of imports
(pa), and quantitative restrictions (q). C
C.6 is the export function. Exports (X) are assumed to be positively re-
lated to the f.o.b. price (p') and the exchange rate (x), but negatively related
to the wage rate (w).
C.7 is the equilibrium condition for aggregate demand and aggregate sup-
ply, where G is government expenditures in real terms. di
oIMPACT OF DEVALUATION IN A SIMPLE KEYNESIAN MODEL 381
C.8 is the demand for real monetary balances (M*/p) as a function of
the nominal interest rate (i) and real output( Y). Initially, it is assumed that
the central bank exogenously controls the stock of money.3 In addition to
f money, another asset is composed of variable-coupon nominal bonds issued by
the government (B). Households are assumed to regard bonds as a perfect sub-
stitute for equities issued by firms to finance investments. When household
portfolios are in equilibrium with respect to the real balance of money, given
the household balance sheet, they also are in equilibrium with respect to bonds
or equities, or both. Therefore, separate relationships are not required for these
alternative assets.
e C.9 determines total real taxes (T) as a direct function of total income
(Y), imports (M), and exports (X) and as an inverse function of the expected
rate of inflation (u).Theforeign dade variables are included because of the
very important role they have had in Chilean government revenues. Inflationary
anticipations have an inverse effect because the legal penalties for delayed pay-
ment of nominal taxes often have been outweighed by the reduction in the real
value of late payments due to inflation. Given exogenous real government ex-
penditures, the tax function determines the size of the government deficit. C. II
gives the government flow budget constraint at any point of time (where dot
accents above variables denote derivatives with respect to time):
(C.ll)
p p
C.10 is the surplus on the balance of payments in dollars (S). It equals
the dollar value df exports (p-TX) minus the dollar value of imports (pMM)
plus net capital inflows (F). The last are assumed to respond positively to in-
a ternal interest rates (i). They also depend on quantitative restrictions (q), but
the sign of this dependence is unclear because there are effects in opposite
directions. If quantitative restrictions are increased, net capital inflows may
rise because outflows are limited by the restrictions. On the other hand, capital
flight may occur and potential inflows may be frightened off by the increased
restrictions.
p
C.2SOLUTION OF THE MODEL
d Equations C. 1—C. 10 are ten relations in ten endogenous variables: Y, L,
p, i, C, I, M, X, T, and S. The exogenous variables are w,M*,G, K,X,
and p3. Under the assumptions that dk =dS==dp'=0, the total







dl =l'YKLdL—l'di+ l'dir (C.4')
dM = + M,dp + M4x + (C.5')





dT = + TMdM + + (C.9')
dS =p'dX—pMdM+ F4i + (C.1O')
C.12' gives the differential of the aggregate supply schedule as derived
from C. 1' and C.2'. The slope in the Y-P plane is positive (Figure C. 1).
dY = — (C.12')
YLL\WP1
An increase in w will shift this supply schedule downward.
C. 13' is the total differential of the aggregate demand schedule as derived
from Ci' and C.3' through C.9'. C. 13" is the same expression except that the
• coefficients of the differential are replaced by as (where the as are positive or
• probably positive in value:
• [iC1(1 — — TMMY)+
(C2—
— +Mr]dY (C. 13')
={_cl[MPTM +
+ + + — dX + (C1TMMQ —
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• M*+B




a1,dY = + a4x + + + dG +aM.dM*(C.13")4,.
The slope in the P-Y plane is positive. This aggregate demand curve shifts up-
ward with decreases in wages and with increases in the exchange rate,4 quanti-
tative restrictions, price expectations, government expenditures, and the money
supply.
In equilibrium aggregate demand must equal aggregate supply. C.12' and
C.13', therefore, can be solved to find the impact of any exogenous change on
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Thus, the comparative static impact of devaluation or of increasing quantitative
restrictions is to increase both real product and the price level.
The consequences of a devaluation for the surplus on the balance of pay-
rnents is ambiguous. C. 10' indicates that this surplus tends to increase because
exports rise, capital inflows rise because of the higher domestic interest rate,
and imports decline because of the direct exchange-rate response. On the other
hand, imports tend to increase because of the higher income and higher do-
mestic prices. If these last two responses are sufficiently strong, they can out-
weigh the others, causing the surplus to decline. The empirical estimates in
Behrman [1974], however, suggest that such an outcome is not probable in the
Chilean case.
C.3 ENDOGENIZATION OF WAGES, MONEY
SUPPLY, AND PRICE EXPECTATIONS
Three of the variables considered exogenous up to this point in this appendix
may well respond to devaluation in the Chilean case. The model in Chapter 2
and in Behrman [1974] provides empirical support for such responses. In this
section the simple Keynesian model of sections C. 1 and C.2 is not formally
expanded to endogenize these variables, but the probable impact of such cx-
tentions is discussed.
The exchange rate at times has served as a source of price expectations
which have affected wages. C. 14 suggests that the increase in real income in
response to devaluation is less if wages respond in that way to the exchange
rate level than if they do not.5 The last term in C. 15' implies that the further
impact on prices is ambiguous, depending upon which of the two components
dominates.
The money supply may respond to devaluations either because the mag-
nitude of the internal financing of the government deficit changes or because
foreign reserves change. For a given amount of real government expenditure,
C.9' suggests that the real value of the deficit falls with devaluation unless im-
port taxes are sufficiently responsive and the change in imports is sufficiently
strong to cause a decline in tax revenue from imports large enough to offset
gains from other sources. Even if the deficit in real terms declines, however, the
deficit in nominal terms may increase.
As is suggested in the last paragraph of the previous section, in the
Cbilean case foreign reserves probably rise in response to devaluation. The
impact on the money supply, moreover, apparently is quite substantial and
more than offsets any dampening due to a possible reduction in the govern-
ment deficit. Under such conditions the endogenization of the money supply
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reinforces the consequences of devaluation on real income and on the price
level that are described above in regard to C.14' and C.15'.
At times in Chile price expectations have been very responsive to ex-
change-rate policy—in part because some governments have used it as an
explicit symbol of stability. C.14' and C.15' indicate that if inflationary expec-
tations increase because of devaluation, both real income and the price level
rise more than otherwise.
NOTES
1. This model is adopted from the work of Sargent [1972). Empirical support for the
signs of most of the derivatives can be found in Behrman [19741.
2. Empirical estimates of variants of neoclassical investment functions for Chile are
in Behrman [1972b1.
3. Open-market operations imply ÷ dB0, a constraint that is used br re-
lation C.3'.
4. If> 0 and IC1T1X.I <X. —M.—CITMMp:,then a.> 0, as seems likely.




DEFINITIONOF CONCEPTS USED IN THE PROJECT
Exchange Rates.'
1. Nominal exchange rate (NER): The official parity for a transaction.
For countries maintaining a single exchange rate registered with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the nominal exchange rate is the registered rate.
2. Effective exchange rate (EER): The number of units of local cur-
rency actually paid or received for a one-dollar international transaction. Sur-
charges, tariffs, the implicit interest foregone on guarantee deposits, and any
other charges against purchases of goods and services abroad are included, as
are rebates, the value of import replenishment rights, and other incentives to
earn foreign exchange for sales of goods and services abroad.
3. Price-level deflated (PLD) nominal exchange rates: The nominal ex-
change rate deflated in relation to some base period by the price level index
of the country.
4. Price-level-deflated EER (PLD-EER): The EER deflated by the
price level index of the country.
5. Purchasing-power-parity adjusted exchange rates: The relevant (nom-
inal or effective) exchange rate multiplied by the ratio of the foreign price
level to the domestic price level.
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Devaluation.
1. Gross devaluation: The change in the parity registered with the IMF
(or, synonymously in most cases, de jure devaluation).
2. Net devaluation: The weighted average of changes in EERs by
classes of transactions (or, synonymously in most cases, de facto devalua-
tion).
3. Real gross devalution: The gross devaluation adjusted for the in-
crease in the domestic price level over the relevant period.
4. Real net devaluation: The net devaluation similarly adjusted.
Protection Concepts.
1. Explicit tariff: The amount of tariff charged against the import of a
good as a percentage of the import price (in local currency at the nominal ex-
change rate) of the good.
2. Implicit tariff (or, synonymously, tariff equivalent): The ratio of the
domesticprice (net of normal distribution costs) minus the c.i.f. import price
to the c.i.f import price in local currency.
3. Premium: The windfall profit accruing to the recipient of an import
license per dollar of imports. It is the difference between the domestic selling
price (net of normal distribution costs) and the landed cost of the item (in-
cluding tariffs and other charges). The premium is thus the difference between
the implicit and the explicit tariff (including other charges) multiplied by the
nominal exchange rate. /
4. Nominal tariff: The tariff—either explicit or implicit as specified—
on a commodity.
5. Effective tariff: The explicit or implicit tariff on value added as dis-
tinct from the nominal tariff on a commodity. This concept is also expressed
as the effective rate of protection (ERP) or as the effective protective rate
(EPR).
6. Domestic resources costs (DRC): The value of domestic resources
(evaluated at "shadow" or opportunity cost prices) employed in earning or
saving a dollar of foreign exchange (in the value-added sense) when produc-
ing domestic goods.
DELINEATION OF PHASES USED IN TRACING THE
EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES
• To achieve comparability of analysis among different countries, each author
of a country study was asked to identify the chronological development of his388 APPENDIXD
•1 country'spayments regime through the following phases. There was no pre-
sumption that a country would necessarily pass through all the phases in
chronological sequence.
Phase 1: During this period, quantitative restrictions on international
transactions are imposed and then intensified. They generally are initiated in
response to an unsustainable payments deficit and then, for a period, are in-
tensified. During the period when reliance upon quantitative restrictions as a
means of controlling the balance of payments is increasing, the country is said
to be in Phase I.
Phase II: During this phase, quantitative restrictions are still intense, but
various price measures are taken to offset some of the undesired results of the
system. Heightened tariffs, surcharges on imports, rebates for exports, special
tourist exchange rates, and other price interventions are used in this phase.
However, primary reliance continues to be placed on quantitative restrictions.
Phase III: This phase is characterized by an attempt to systematize the
changes which take place during Phase II.It generally starts with a formal
exchange-rate change and may be accompanied by removal of some of the
surcharges, etc., imposed during Phase II and by reduced reliance upon quan-
titative restrictions. Phase III may be little more than a tidying-up operation
(in which case the likelihood is that the country will re-enter Phase II), or it
may signal the beginning of withdrawal from reliance upon quantitative re-
strictions.
Phase IV: If the changes in Phase III result in adjustments within the
country, so that liberalization can continue, the country is said to enter Phase
IV. The necessary adjustments generally include increased foreign-exchange
earnings and gradual relaxation of quantitative restrictions. The latter relaxa-
tion may take the form of changes in the nature of quantitative restrictions or
of increased foreign-exchange allocations, and thus reduced premiums under
the same administration system.
Phase V: This is a period during which an exchange regime is fully lib-
eralized. There is full convertibility on current account, and quantitative re-
strictions are not employed as a means of regulating the ex ante balance of
payments.
NOTE
1. The present study also includes the concept of the premium-inclusiveprice-/eve/-
deflated effective exchange rate [PLD.EER(PI)],i.e.,the PLD-EER adjusted for the





AIDAgency for International Development of the United States De-
partment of State
ALALCAsociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (seeLAFFA)
CAP CompañIa Acero de PacIfico (Pacific Steel Company)
ClAPComité Interamericano de Alianza para el Progreso (Inter-
American Committee of the Alliance for Progress)
COCAIN Comisión de Cambios Internacionales(International Ex-
change Commission)
CODELCO Corporación del Cobre (Copper Corporation)
CONDECOR Consejo Nacional de ComercioExterior(National
Council of Foreign Commerce)
CONVENSA Corporación de Venta de Salitre y Yodo (Nitrate and
Iodine Marketing Corporation)
COPEC CompañIa de Petróleo de Chile (Petroleum Company of Chile)
CORFO Corporación del Fomento (Development Corporation)
DECDirección de EstadIstica y Censos (Statistics and Census Depart-
ment)
ECLA Economic Commission for Latin America
ENAP Empresa Nacional de Petróleo (National Petroleum Enterprise)
ENDESA Empresa Nacional de Electricidad, S.A. (National Electrical
Enterprise)
GDP Gross domestic product
GNP Gross national product
IBRDInternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development
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IMFInternationalMonetary Fund
LNEInstituto Nacional de Estadisticas (National Statistical Institute)
LAFTA Latin American Free Trade Area (seeALALC)
LMELondonMetal Exchange
NA National accounts (used in reference to national accounts ex-
change rate)
SOQUIM Sociedad QuImica y Minera de Chile, S.A. (Chemical and
Mining Company of Chile)
UNCTAD United Nations Commission for Trade and Development
/
.
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